Mercer Law Review
Volume 28
Number 1 Annual Survey of Georgia Law

Article 7

12-1976

Criminal Law
Charles H. Weston
Walker P. Johnson Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Weston, Charles H. and Johnson, Walker P. Jr. (1976) "Criminal Law," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 28 : No. 1 ,
Article 7.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol28/iss1/7

This Survey Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Criminal Law
By Charles H. Weston* and Walker P. Johnson, Jr.**

The several hundred criminal cases decided by the Georgia Supreme
Court and the Georgia Court of Appeals have been gleaned in an effort to
present what we believe are the most interesting and informative. As we
went through these cases, one thing became evident: Some relief must be
given to the courts in their monumental task of hearing an increasing
number of appeals and writs.
In categorizing the cases, we have used broad characterization in some
instances but have headlined a very narrow point in others. In any event,
the heading should point a reader in the right direction.
I.

INDICTMENT

There were several significant decisions on indictment-related legal
problems during the survey period. Some of these cases fall into other
categories in this article. Among the cases were several fatal-variance
cases.
In Ealey v. State,' the words "with intent to commit a felony" 2 were used
in a burglary indictment that did not specify the felony. The defect was
fatal. The defense must raise the point by demurrer.
In Williamson v. State,' the indictment alleged a distribution and sale
of Phencyclidine (PCP). The evidence showed the substance to be phencyclidine hydrochloride. This was held to be a fatal variance. The court of
appeals found that the words had two different meanings and that the
variance could not be characterized as a mere slight discrepancy.
Mize v. State' involved the wording of a simple battery accusation. The
accusation on which appellant was tried was couched in the language of
Georgia Code §26-1304(b) and alleged an attempt to commit physical
harm. The evidence showed that the prosecutrix was squeezed, pinched,
and grabbed in the side. The court of appeals held that the trial court erred
* Assistant District Attorney, Macon Judicial Circuit, Macon, Georgia. Mercer University
(A.B., 1968; J.D., 1971). Member of the Georgia Bar.
** Assistant District Attorney, Macon Judicial Circuit, Macon, Georgia. Emory University
(B.A., 1959; J.D. 1962). Member of the Georgia Bar. Any views expressed in this article are
solely those of the authors.
1. 136 Ga. App. 292, 221 S.E.2d 50 (1975).
2.

GA. CODE ANN. §26-1601 (1972).

3.
4.

134 Ga. App. 864, 216 S.E.2d 684 (1975).
135 Ga. App. 561, 218 S.E.2d 450 (1975).
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in charging that simple battery consisted of intentional physical contact
either insulting or provoking in nature or causing physical harm. Since the
accusation was drawn to allege an attempt to commit physical harm, such
an attempt would have to be proved before the defendant could be convicted. The accusation had not alleged the insulting contact, so the jury
could not consider whether the contact was in that category. The jury
could consider only whether there was an attempt to commit physical
harm.
Mack v. Ricketts5 discussed a theft-by-taking indictment. The indictment charged the appellant with taking property valued at less than $100,
but the proof showed that property valued at more than $100 was taken.
The court held that the conviction for the felony and the imposition of a
felony sentence were proper. The court noted that in Georgia there are not
two separate theft-by-taking offenses. There is only one crime, and, upon
conviction, the punishment is determined by the value of the property
taken.
Jarrell v. State' concerned the question of misjoinder of capital offenses
and non-capital offenses. The opinion contained a lengthy and understandable evaluation of the problem. The court held that in view of Code
§26-506, prior cases that found misjoinder of capital offenses and noncapital offenses based on appellate jurisdictional problems were overruled.
The test is the exercise of judicial discretion in the interests of justice.
Bostick v. Ricketts7 involved an interesting situation in which an unmasked recidivist indictment went out with the jury, even though the
actual certified records of appellant's prior convictions named in the indictment were rejected by the trial court after defense objections. While
counsel for appellant did object to the records themselves and kept that
evidence out, counsel failed to specifically object to the unmasked indictment going out with the jury. In a 4-3 opinion, the court found that this
constituted a waiver, so there was no error. Justice Jordan, joined by
Justices Gunter and Hill, wrote an excellent dissenting opinion. He said
there could be no waiver because the defense counsel specifically objected
to the introduction of the actual records of the prior convictions, which
constituted the highest and best evidence of that fact. The dissent said
Cofer v. Hopper,' relied on by the majority, was distinguishable, since in
that case the appellant had allowed the introduction of prior convictions
without objecting.
The court decided numerous cases involving the felony-murder rule.
Some of these are mentioned elsewhere in this article. One felony-murder
case involved the precise question whether felony-murder and murder with
5.
6.
7.
8.

236
234
236
233

Ga.
Ga.
Ga.
Ga.

86, 222 S.E.2d 337 (1976).
410, 216 S.E.2d 258 (1975).
304, 223 S.E.2d 686 (1976).
155, 210 S.E.2d 678 (1974).
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malice could be charged in the same count of an indictment. Leutner v.
State' answered the question in the affirmative.
II.

ARGUMENT

Reviewing all the decisions rendered during the survey period makes it
obvious that inflammatory or improper argument by prosecutors was constantly on the minds of defense counsel. This is a matter near and dear to
defense lawyers' hearts-asking for mistrials based on the prosecutor's
argument. Our appellate courts so far have refused to hamstring prosecutors in this area and have not shut the door on the making of fervent, strong
arguments. We hope all trial judges will take note of some of these decisions.
There were many enumerations of error in Chenault v. State,, and one
issue was whether the prosecutor's closing remarks were prejudicial and
inflammatory. The case arose from the shooting-death of Mrs. Alberta
King, mother of Martin Luther King, Jr. During sentencing as he argued
for the death penalty, the prosecutor made the following comments: "The
whole world must know how we deal with murderers who come into our
county for the express purpose of assassination. This county cannot afford
the publicity. . . . We can't have these reporters writing [that a] life
sentence is all you get in this county."" Considering the comments on
appeal, the supreme court held that though such statements may have
been objectionable during the guilt-determining stage, protection of the
community was a proper consideration for the jury in determining an
appropriate sentence.
Leutner v. State'" is instructive on the question of inflammatory argument by the prosecutor. This gist of the argument was to ask the jury to
give the victim's family as much sympathy as it would give the young
defendant on trial. The prosecutor commented that the defendant didn't
deserve anybody's sympathy and urged the jury to look at the pictures of
the victim. Other, stronger language was used. Presiding Justice Undercofler wrote: "[Wihere the language complained of introduces no new fact
but is merely a forceful though possibly extravagant method of impressing
offense and the solemnity of the duty of
on the jury the magnitude of the
'3
the jurors, no error is shown.'
Bradley v. State 4 is another case in which the prosecutor's comments
came close to being prejudicial but were held to provide no basis for reversal. The prosecutor argued in his closing that he inferred from the evidence
9. 235 Ga. 77, 218 S.E.2d 820 (1975).
10. 234 Ga. 216, 215 S.E.2d 223 (1975).
11. Id. at 224, 215 S.E.2d at 229.
12. 235 Ga. 77, 218 S.E.2d 820 (1975).
13. Id. at 84, 218 S.E.2d at 826.
14. 135 Ga. App. 865, 219 S.E.2d 451 (1975).
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that the only reason the defendant was trying the case was a gamble that
the jury would give him a lower sentence than the judge. The court of
appeals held that the argument was not a statement of belief, based on a
personal opinion, in appellant's guilt of the crime charged. It was nothing
more than "legal pyro-technics based on a permissible deduction from the
evidence" and from the fact that the appellant had failed to address testimony in rebuttal of the state's evidence, the court said.
There were several cases in which the appellate courts were called upon
to decide the question whether the prosecutor had improperly commented
on the defendant's failure to testify. In Mahar v. State,'5 for example, the
prosecutor in his closing argument remarked that the defendant had offered no evidence to contradict the state's case; he later asked the jury,
"Where is the defendant's case?" In the context in which these remarks
were made, Judge Marshall said, it was clear that they were not comments
on the defendant's failure to testify'6 and they did not have the effect of
shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant. The remarks were held
to be permissible comments on the failure to adduce evidence to rebut the
state's evidence. In Ingram v. State," an objection was made to the prosecutor's comment on the defense attorney's failure to make an opening
statement. The court of appeals found no error; it said the comments came
close to a comment on the failure of the defendant to testify but did not
amount to such.
In the companion cases of Brewer v. State and Hardaway v. State,'" the
court of appeals once again considered the time-honored question whether
the prosecutor's arguments and inferences were not reasonably and legitimately warranted by the evidence. Judge Webb in a well written opinion
reiterated the view of some earlier cases-the view that has given trial
judges some trouble. "Counsel should not go outside the facts in the case
and the inferences to be deduced from them and lug in extraneous matter
as if it were part of the case," Judge Webb said, "but upon the facts in
the record and upon the deductions he may choose to draw, an attorney
may make almost any form of argument he desires."
Im.

ARGERSINGER-GIDEON PROBLEMS

The appellate courts of our state were called on repeatedly to consider
Argersinger'-Gideon0 questions. A plethora of cases was presented fordecision with many cases being reversed as to sentencing and some as to
guilt.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

137 Ga. App. 116, 223 S.E.2d 204 (1975).
See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
134 Ga. App. 935, 216 S.E.2d 608 (1975).
136 Ga. App. 285, 220 S.E.2d 780 (1975).
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1971).
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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Morgan v. State2 was the most significant case on the development of
the law in this area. The case involved the question whether Argersinger
was to be retroactively applied. During sentencing the state introduced the
appellant's two prior misdemeanor convictions in which the appellant had
not had counsel. The appellant objected. The court of appeals held that
Argersinger was not retroactive and affirmed,2 but the Georgia Supreme
Court reversed in a well reasoned opinion.
Justice Jordan stated: "We hold today that without a valid waiver, the
lack of counsel at a trial for a misdemeanor so affects the integrity of the
fact-finding process and the reliability of the guilty verdict that the ruling
in Argersinger must be retroactively applied."2 Justice Jordan noted that
the U.S. Supreme Court retroactively applied Gideon, which gave the right
to counsel in felony cases, on the ground that the lack of counsel jeopardized the accuracy and fairness of the entire trial; the court was "unable to
see how the integrity of a misdemeanor conviction could be any less affected by a lack of counsel than a felony conviction."
One case that was reversed and remanded for resentencing was Harrison
v. State. 4 The trial judge personally and actively solicited from the defendant admissions of three separate, prior convictions, all of which were
invalid because of Argersinger. The trial judge indicated his willingness
and intention to consider them in aggravation of punishment despite their
infirmities.
Schamber v. State25 was remanded for a determination whether the
defendant had been represented by counsel or had intelligently waived
counsel on each of the occasions dealt with in his record, which was read
2
five prior convictions
before a sentence was imposed. In Dent v. State,'
counsel,
three did not, so
showed
Two
during
sentencing.
were considered
on
sentencing.
the case reversed
Arnold v. State17 held that prior convictions that fail to show the assistance or waiver of counsel are not ipso facto inadmissible. Curative efforts
by the state are not barred at the resentencing hearing. In this case, the
defendant admitted on cross-examination that he had had the assistance
of counsel. In Mitchell v. State,2 the state was able on cross-examination
to elicit admissions of the defendant's prior convictions without showing
that the defendant either had had or had waived counsel in those convictions. The state contended that such evidence was admissible as impeachment evidence. Counsel for the defendant had not objected below, so no
error was found.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

235
135
235
136
236
136
134
136

Ga.
Ga.
Ga.
Ga.
Ga.
Ga.
Ga.
Ga.

632, 221 S.E.2d 47 (1975).
App. 139, 217 S.E.2d 175 (1975).
at 633, 221 S.E.2d at 48.
App. 77, 220 S.E.2d 77 (1975).
159, 223 S.E.2d 138 (1976).
App. 366, 221 S.E.2d 228 (1975).
App. 853, 216 S.E.2d 373 (1975).
App. 390, 221 S.E.2d 465 (1975).
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Houser v. State9 was a tough case for prosecutors to swallow. It apparently extended Argersinger and Loper v. Beto.30 The prosecutor crossexamined a witness for appellant Houser about a previous conviction of
Houser in which Houser had not been represented by counsel nor had
waived counsel. The testimony was given during the sentencing phase and
was in response to the witness's testimony that he did not know Houser as
a violent man. No objection was made, but the matter was raised in an
extraordinary motion for a new trial. The court relied on Turner v.
Hopper,3 which held that impeaching a defendant's credibility with convictions that are constitutionally invalid because of the denial of assistance
of counsel deprived the defendant of due process of law. Most prosecutors
certainly would feel that even with the Argersinger infirmities such impeachment should be admissible to test the witness's knowledge of the
matters about which he was testifying.
IV.

EVIDENCE

The appellate courts were repeatedly called upon to decide questions of
circumstantial evidence and sufficiency of the evidence. Hearsay questionS32 also were raised repeatedly, but they posed little problem for the
courts. There were only a few really interesting or novel cases on rare
evidentiary questions.
. One such case was Graham v. State.Y The defendant used delusional
compulsion-insanity as a defense, and the first two elements were present:
(1) the appellant was laboring under a delusion at the time of the shooting,
and (2) his act was connected with, and-in response to, the delusion. The
case turned on the third element: whether the defendant was justified in
acting under the delusion.
The salient feature of the delusion described by the psychiatrist was
appellant's perception of his wife as being in desperate danger of losing her
life. Furthermore, the psychiatrist interpreted the appellant's actions as an
attempt to extricate his wife from mortal danger. Justice Ingram said that
if these circumstances had actually occurred the appellant might have
been justified in using deadly force to prevent his wife's death; but the
facts showed that the appellant fired a shot through a closed door and then
reprimanded and shot his wife several times after she became clearly visible through the open doorway. Under this evidence, the jury was not authorized to find that the appellant's delusion justified his act of shooting
his wife.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

234
405
231
See
236

Ga. 209, 214 S.E.2d 893 (1975).
U.S. 473 (1972).
Ga. 672, 203 S.E.2d 481 (1974).
GA. CODE ANN. §38-302 (1974).
Ga. 378, 223 S.E.2d 803 (1976).
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Hewell v. State" had a colorful opinion by Judge Evans. Error had been
enumerated because the state was allowed to use a transcript of testimony
of an absent witness after the state contended it could not locate the
witness through a diligent search. Judge Evans pointed out what is needed
to demonstrate the inaccessibility of a witness. In this case, many steps
which could have been taken to ascertain the availability of the witness
were not taken.
Favors v. State 5 raised a point of first impression. The appellant
enumerated as error the exclusion of the first-offender record of conviction3" of one of the witnesses who testified for the state. The court was
called upon to balance the protection afforded by law to a first-offender
against the right of a person accused of crime to cross-examine the witnesses called against him. The court properly reasoned that a possible
"lack of trustworthiness of a witness is shown by a verdict of guilty, or a
plea of guilty, whether or not a formal conviction has been entered." The
court held that the rights of a defendant in a criminal case to impeach the
testimony of the witnesses against him prevails over a first-offender's right
to be protected from the stigma of a criminal record.
The thorny problem of lie detectors was raised in Stack v. State37 and
6
In Stack, the supreme court held that results of a lieHerlong v. State."
detector test were indirectly placed before the jury by admission of evidence that the defendant's alleged co-conspirator took a lie-detector test
and entered a guilty plea. The conviction was reversed. The court said the
jury might have drawn from the evidence an inference that the appellant
might have failed his lie-detector test.
In Herlong, however, a conviction was affirmed even though lie-detector
evidence prejudicial to the defendant was placed before the jury. The trial
court admitted testimony that a witness was given a lie-detector test and
that immediately thereafter arrest warrants were obtained. The appellant
relied on Stack and contended that such testimony raised an inference that
the lie-detector test showed the testimony implicating Herlong to be true.
The court held that the testimony was admissible under Georgia Code §38302 to explain the conduct of the officers in obtaining arrest warrants
immediately after the test. The dissent in the case may be the better
opinion.
There was a long line of cases dealing with circumstantial-evidence questions. Most of the cases involved routine interpretations of the reasonablehypothesis rule. Harris v. State39 contained a well written discussion of
circumstantial evidence and the jury's duty and the court's duty on review.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

136 Ga. App. 420, 221 S.E.2d 219 (1975).
234 Ga. 80, 214 S.E.2d 645 (1975).
GA. CODE ANN. §§27-2727 to -2732 (1972).
234 Ga. 19, 214 S.E.2d 514 (1975).
236 Ga. 326, 223 S.E.2d 672 (1976).
236 Ga. 242, 223 S.E.2d 643 (1976).
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The case points out that questions of reasonableness are jury questions and
will not be disturbed on appeal unless the verdict of guilty is unsupportable as a matter of law as defined in Smith v. State. 0 In Smith, the court
of appeals long ago reasoned that the best yardstick of a reasonable hypothesis was the opinion of 12 upright and intelligent jurors.
There was also litigation over evidentiary problems in probation revocations. Once again, there were numerous cases interpreting the slightevidence rule. Two interesting cases were Dickerson v. State" and Christy
v. State. 2 The Dickerson case is most significant for Judge Webb's dissenting opinion, in which he strongly disagreed with the slight-evidence rule.
In Morrissey v. Brown, 3 Judge Webb said, the U.S. Supreme Court had
held that whether any procedural protections were due depended on the
extent to which an individual will be condemned to suffer grievous loss;
in Gagnon v. Scarpelli," he said, the Supreme Court held that probationers
and parolees are entitled to the same due-process rights. Judge Webb
believed that the slight-evidence rule fell short of due-process requirements enunciated in Morrissey and that the probationer's violation should
be shown by a preponderance of the evidence if the revocation is based
upon the breach of a probationary condition. Judge Webb also felt that, if
revocation is based solely upon the commission of a new crime, the revocation proceedings must be stayed until after the disposition of the criminal
trial.
The decision in Christy was narrower. The court of appeals held that
under the slight-evidence rule a probationer may be convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. The court reasoned that probation hearings are not subject to the rules of evidence of normal criminal
proceedings and that evidentiary matters are within the sound discretion
of the trial judge.
Henderson v. State15 raised the question of a deceased's general reputation for violence. The cases are clear that evidence of specific instances of
violence should be excluded. The trial court excluded testimony about the
deceased's general reputation for violence. The supreme court reversed; to
exclude such evidence, it said, was to so limit the defense that impeachment would have virtually no meaning.
V.

SENTENCE-RELATED PROBLEMS

The appellate courts of our state considered many problems related to
sentencing. Even though sentencing by judges is firmly established by
40.
41.
42.

56 Ga. App. 384, 192 S.E. 647 (1937).
136 Ga. App. 885, 222 S.E.2d 649 (1975).
134 Ga. App. 504, 215 S.E.2d 267 (1975).

43.
44.

408 U.S. 471 (1972).
411 U.S. 778 (1973).

45.

234 Ga. 827, 218 S.E.2d 612 (1975).
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now, trial judges continued to have trouble and defense lawyers continued
to futilely throw this point into their appeals. Most of these cases were not
6
noteworthy. One case that was noteworthy is McNeese v. State."
After convicting a defendant for rape, the jury imposed a three-year
sentence. No objection was made. The issue on appeal was whether the
sentencing by the jury could be harmless error or whether the objection
could be waived. The court noted that in Wheeles v. State" the court of
appeals had held that the setting of a six-year sentence by a jury violated
Georgia Code §27-2503 and had remanded the case for the judge to fix the
sentence. The decision in Wheeles assured sentence review under Code
§27-2511(a), which provides for review of sentences of five years or more
imposed by the court. The supreme court then pointed out that since this
was a three-year sentence, the rationale of Wheeles was inapplicable to
McNeese. The court held that the appellant, by failing to object, waived
the right to be sentenced by the judge.
Anthony v. Hopper 8 was a noteworthy habeas corpus decision. The
Georgia Supreme Court held that the mandates of North Carolina v.
Pearce9 applied to resentencing after a successful collateral attack, just as
it applies after an appeal. The court found the Pearce proscription against
vindictiveness as the motive behind an increased sentence was violated.
The court was unable to find facts supporting the increased sentence.
In Pounds v. State, 0 the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the sentence
and said that the trial court, in passing sentence, considered repeated
rumors about the defendant's being in the business of receiving stolen
goods. Georgia Code §27-2503 does not authorize the consideration of
rumor at the pre-sentence hearing, and a new trial was ordered on the issue
of punishment.
Munsford v. State5 l involved the question whether information in a presentence investigation should be regarded, in a pre-sentence hearing, as
evidence either in aggravation or mitigation of punishment. The information-certain convictions of which appellant received no notice prior to
trial-did not constitute evidence, Justice Ingram said, but adverse matter
likely to influence the trial court should be revealed to defense counsel
before the pre-sentence hearing to give the accused an opportunity to
explain or rebut. Since the transcripts did not show that the reports were
used by the trial judge to increase the length of the sentences, the court
found no cause for reversal.
46.
47.
48.

236 Ga. 26, 222 S.E.2d 318 (1976).
135 Ga. App. 406, 218 S.E.2d 88 (1975).
235 Ga. 336, 219 S.E.2d 413 (1975).

49.
50.

395 U.S. 711 (1969).
136 Ga. App. 852, 222 S.E.2d 629 (1975).

51.

235 Ga. 38, 218 S.E.2d 792 (1975).
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INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES

Several cases interpreted statutes on vagueness and overbreadth
grounds. Lanthrip v. State52 interpreted Georgia Code §26-1307(a) on terroristic threats. The appellant contended the statute violated due process
because it was too vague, indefinite, uncertain and overbroad to be capable
of uniform enforcement. The court disagreed in a well written opinion by
Justice Ingram. He said the "unavoidable message of the express language
contained in the statute is that one may not communicate to another
person a threat to commit a crime of violence, for the purpose of terrorizing
that person, without violating the statute. Thus, there are no hidden pitfalls or disguised traps into which the unwary might fall and commit the
crime."
The court also disagreed that the statute was so broad that it conflicted
with the commission of the offense of simple assault under Code §26-1301.
The court noted that when the threat is communicated to terrorize another, the crime is complete. "The communication of a terroristic threat
is not punishable under the simple-assault statute, and one may be guilty
of simple assault without violating the terroristic-threats statute."
The Georgia Supreme Court upheld the peeping-tom statute 3 in Lemon
v. State." The court found it not unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
The statute is sufficiently definite to apprise a person of ordinary intelligence of the conduct forbidden by the statute.
Breland v. State" held that the theft of two Gulf gasoline trucks, "taken
from the same place at the same time from the same owner under the same
circumstances, can constitute only one offense, not two."
Interpreting a larceny statute in Johnson v. State,56 the court of appeals
held that theft by receiving stolen property clearly includes guilty retention, shown by knowledge after the fact; earlier cases requiring knowledge
at the time stolen goods were received no longer control.
The obstruction-of-officers section" has been a source of some concern
over the years. Allen v. State" had an interesting, novel set of facts behind
the issue whether the law enforcement officer was carrying out his duties
at the time h was obstructed. A deputy sheriff was attempting to deliver
to a tavern owner a "license" to enter his building on a Sunday to make
repairs, but a "bouncer" told the deputy he "ain't going in, not unless you
pay a dollar." The bouncer pressed his point, apparently without great
civility, and the deputy finally called for help. When the officers told the
52.

235 Ga. 10, 218 S.E.2d 771 (1975).

53.
54.

GA. CODE ANN. §26-3002 (1972).
235 Ga. 74, 218 S.E.2d 818 (1975).

55.
56.

135 Ga. App. 478, 218 S.E.2d 153 (1975)
135 Ga. App. 768, 219 S.E.2d 25 (1975).

57.

GA. CODE ANN. §26-2505 (1972).

58.

137 Ga. App. 21, 222 S.E.2d 856 (1976).
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bouncer he was under arrest, there was a scuffle. As a defense to the charge
of obstructing an officer, the bouncer said a sheriff could not license a
tavern owner to enter his building on a Sunday, but Judge Evans said the
owner's request presented a "likely" situation. The conviction was affirmed.
Last but not least is Head v. State," which overruled a long line of cases
holding that whether an accused has a license to carry a pistol is a matter
of defense, not an element of the offense. The failure to have a license is
now considered an element of the crime.
VII.

CONFESSIONS

Surprisingly, problems related to confessions were not heavily litigated
during the survey period. However, there were several quite significant
cases decided during the period. In several of these cases our appellate
courts were plowing new ground.
State v. Lowe6" made all prosecuting attorneys very unhappy and certainly will restrict the effectiveness of prosecutors' cross-examinations in
many future cases. In Lowe, the prosecutor was allowed to cross-examine
the defendant about the defendant's silence at the time of his arrest. The
question was whether this type of cross-examination violated the holding
of United States v. Hale." In Hale, the U.S. Supreme Court had said any
probative value in the defendant's pre-trial silence was outweighed by the
prejudicial impact of admitting it into evidence.
The court of appeals said that although a witness may be impeached by
prior inconsistent statements, to try to impeach on a defendant's silence
is prejudicial and irrelevant, raises serious Miranda62 questions, and undermines the due-process rights afforded by Miranda.
3
Lowe should be compared with Howard v. State,"
another decision on
the probative value and admissibility of evidence about the silence of a
defendant. Howard was seized by police shortly after the crime was committed and taken to the house of the prosecutrix, who identified Howard.
Evidence of the appellant's failure to answer or deny the identification was
admissible. The court of appeals found this was not a Miranda situation;
it held that "there is a difference between official police interrogation and
an identification by the victim of a crime, which amounts to an accusation."
Ingram v. State"4 clarified the question whether Miranda required that
the police advise suspects that they could stop the questioning at any time
during the interrogation and remain silent or request the presence of an
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

235 Ga. 677, 221 S.E.2d 435 (1975).
136 Ga. App. 631, 222 S.E.2d 50 (1975).
422 U.S. 71 (1975).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
137 Ga. App. 352, 223 S.E.2d 745 (1976).
134 Ga. App. 935, 216 S.E.2d 608 (1975).
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attorney. The court of appeals said the information was not mandatory.
Another area of great confusion has been the question of when Miranda
warnings are actually required. Our appellate courts as well as most of the
federal appellate courts have often missed the main point of
Miranda-that the interrogation by police officers was done in a policedominated atmosphere after the suspect was in custody. Many cases have
unfortunately turned on whether an investigation had "focused" on a potential suspect and have shown a lack of understanding of the in-custody
requirement. One well written opinion that, fortunately, did not focus on
"focus" was the Georgia Supreme Court's opinion in Smith v. State.65 The
court carefully considered a close case and found no Miranda violation
because the defendant was not in custody. Smith also contained an interesting factual situation raising a question of accomplice corroboration.
6
The situation in Gibbs v. State"
caused the supreme court some concern. The main point in Gibbs, a murder case, was the voluntariness of an
incriminating statement given by the appellant six weeks before she was
ruled mentally incompetent to stand trial. Years later, in the trial for the
actual offense, the incriminating statement was allowed in evidence over
objection. On appeal, the supreme court held that from all the evidence
presented it could not say that the decision of the trial court was clearly
erroneous, but the case was reversed and remanded for a determination of
the defendant's competence to stand trial. Justice Jordan wrote in a logical
concurring opinion that the totality of the circumstances of the case
showed that the defendant was mentally incompetent to make a voluntary
confession.
VInI.

APPEAL AND ERROR

Our appellate courts were called upon to examine a plethora of cases
involving the mechanics of the appeal process, and they seemed more than
ready to follow recent trends that often encourage totally frivolous appeals.
Powell v. Hopper7 and Allen v. Hopper,6 ' for example, held that an appointed lawyer cannot deliberately forego a client's appeal and said
whether to appeal is a question solely for the client, not for counsel.
One significant decision was Bethay v. State,"' which involved a point
of first impression. The trial judge overruled a motion for acquittal made
at the close of the state's case, and the defense then put in evidence. The
question was what evidence the appellate court could consider in reviewing
the trial judge's ruling. The court said "justice requires that a person found
guilty after trial by jury should not be freed because the appellate court is
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prohibited from considering the entirety of the evidence." The reviewing
court can consider all the evidence.
Yates v. Brown " will be the last case we'll note in this area, and last and
least is a suitable place for this decision. The supreme court held that if a
prisoner with an appeal pending escapes but is recaptured or surrenders
before dismissal of his appeal, the appeal will not be dismissed. Justice
Hill's concurring opinion is excellent in its reasoning.

IX.

HABEAS CORPUS

As would be expected at this point in the history of our country, our
appellate courts, both state and federal, have been inundated with habeascorpus petitions. During the survey period, the Georgia appellate courts
were repeatedly called on to decide habeas cases raising the same points,
so most of the habeas cases were unremarkable. There were several noteworthy decisions which do deserve our attention, however.
Reed v. Hopper" interpreted the doctrine of selective review as created
by §3 of the 1975 Habeas Corpus Act. 2 A petitioner, to have an adverse
decision of the habeas court reviewed, must be granted a certificate of
probable cause by the Georgia Supreme Court. If the application for probable cause is denied, the appeal from the habeas court will not be heard.
The decision in Reed pointed out that the act provided for one justice to
make this determination, but in actuality a quorum has decided as a body
whether the application for probable cause should be granted.
There were numerous points raised in the petition attacking the act. The
majority held that the provision allowing one justice to decide on the
application for probable cause is unconstitutional, but it held that the
unconstitutionality did not void the statute, since the legislative intent
could be sustained once the objectionable portion was excised. The court
found no denial of equal protection in allowing a prison warden a right of
appeal without a certification of probable cause. The court said that a
judgment adverse to the warden reverses the sentence already imposed and
presumably will require further proceedings by the state, but a judgment
adverse to the petitioner is merely an affirmation of the lower court's
decision.
Another interesting, noteworthy habeas petition was presented in
Callahan v. State." In Callahan, the habeas-corpus petition was filed by
the appellant while he was an inmate in the Tennessee State Penitentiary
and attacked a Whitfield County, Georgia, sentence not yet being served.
The petition was filed in the Whitfield Superior Court, which had imposed
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the alleged illegal sentence. The court held that, because a detainer had
been lodged against petitioner by Georgia authorities, the petitioner was
in the constructive custody of the Georgia prison authorities.
The court in Hunter v. Brown" decided there was no need to raise all
grounds for relief in an original or amended habeas petition. The
appellant-petitioner had been convicted of two separate offenses. He had
filed his first habeas corpus petition alleging constitutional errors at the
first trial; later he filed his second petition concerning the second trial. The
supreme court said a petitioner was not prohibited from bringing separate
habeas-corpus petitions attacking different convictions if there had been
separate trials.
The oft-litigated problem of effective assistance of counsel was presented
in Walker v. Hopper." The case clearly defines the duty of counsel in
connection with the decision of a defendant to plead guilty. Minutes prior
to the petitioner's plea, the court appointed counsel to assist the petitioner.
The attorney, of course, made no independent investigation, engaged in no
plea-bargaining, presented no mitigating circumstances to the court before
the sentencing, and admitted that his handling of fee-paid cases was different. The supreme court held: "When a person indicates a desire to enter a
guilty plea, the duty of counsel is limited to ascertaining whether the
decision so to plead is voluntarily and knowingly made."76
Byrd v. Hopper" explains the standard the habeas-corpus court will use
to decide whether routine trial errors will give rise to habeas relief. In Byrd
v. Hopper, the habeas petition complained that a charge given by the trial
court on the question of recent possession of stolen goods was erroneous.
The court held that the error committed, if any, in an isolated portion of
the charge did not so infect the entire proceeding that the conviction was
rendered void on due-process grounds.
Other habeas-corpus cases have been noted in other portions of this
article.
X.

SPEEDY TRIAL

Matters related to speedy trials were frequently litigated in our appellate
courts during the survey period. There were no landmark decisions in this
area, and the law has not been significantly changed in this area. However,
there were a few significant decisions rendered-significant mostly from
the standpoint of well articulated, interestingly written opinions.
Two such opinions were one written by Judge Evans in State v. King"8
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and one written by Judge Marshall in State v. Weeks."9 In both decisions,
the Georgia Court of Appeals thoroughly examined the four criteria of
Barker v. Wingo.8 0 In King, Judge Evans colorfully balanced the four criteria spelled out in Barker and found that appellant had been denied a
speedy trial. In Weeks, a different result was reached. Judge Marshall
likewise balanced the four criteria of Barker, and, in a lucid, well-reasoned
opinion, concluded that the trial judge abused his discretion in granting
the plea in bar. Here the state was appealing and winning.
XI.

COMMITMENT HEARING

'

The Georgia Supreme Court decided several major cases on commitment
hearings. These cases will be treated more or less together and in an abbreviated fashion, not because they are not important-they are-but because
the holdings are straightforward.
The cases break down into two categories: whether a commitment hearing is necessary and whether there is a right to counsel. The question
whether a commitment hearing must be held at all was before the court
in State v. Middlebrooks8 l and was answered by a resounding no.
More difficult was the question of counsel, and especially the question
of what happens if hearing is held without counsel. The leading cases
decided in this area were State v. Houston2 and State v. Hightower."
Houston held that a commitment hearing was a critical stage in the prosecution and that appointed counsel must be furnished to an indigent defendant. Hightower, on the other hand, held that when counsel is not provided, the error may be harmless" and placed the burden on the state to
show beyond a reasonable doubt that the failure to provide counsel at the
hearing did not contribute to the guilty verdict.
XII.

JURY CHARGES

The courts of Georgia rendered several opinions concerning the proper
method of instructing juries, particularly in the area of affirmative defenses. Perhaps the most important case was State v. Slonaker.5 The holding
clarified for trial courts what must be charged and what need not be
charged about lesser included crimes. The court then set out four rules
concerning lesser included offenses, and all lawyers and judges in the state
should commit them to memory. The decision should prevent error from
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creeping into cases and should make lawyers more careful, since written
requests are now required for lesser included offenses unless they are specifically set out in the indictment.
8
State v. McNeill"
held that entrapment was an affirmative defense and
thus it was not error to fail to instruct the jury that the state must prove
lack of entrapment beyond a reasonable doubt. In Ward v. State,"7 the
defendant changed his alibi. The Court pointed out that there is no burden
on the defendant with an alibi defense. This view is sound, because alibi
is not an affirmative defense; the identity of the perpetrator of crime is an
element that the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt before a
conviction can be achieved.
Over the years, many trial judges and some appellate judges have had
difficulty with the burden of proof in criminal cases, especially when the
so-called affirmative defenses were raised. The Georgia Supreme Court has
tried to lay to rest any further problems in this area, but the fact that so
much confusion has existed in the past probably means that continued
difficulty can be expected.
The defenses set out in the Georgia Code"8 are not exhaustive; others can
also be considered to fall under the heading of affirmative defense. The real
import of an affirmative defense seems to be that something more than a
plea of not guilty is necessary to enable that defense to be placed before a
jury. This definition standing alone might take an insanity defense out of
the affirmative defense cateogry, but the presumption of sanity, which
benefits the state, in effect means that there must be something shown by
the evidence to enable a jury to find the defendant insane.
The law has always been clear that the prosecution has the burden of
establishing every essential element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt. It must show, among other things, (1) that the act charged
was committed; (2) that the defendant on trial is the person who committed the act; and (3) that it was done with criminal intent, an element that
would include the sanity of the defendant. While the plea of not guilty
challenges the prosecution to prove those elements beyond a reasonable
doubt, the affirmative defense may change the posture of proof to some
extent.
An affirmative defense might admit the act was done but deny that any
criminal intent was present. This is the case with the defenses of insanity,
justification, claim of right or entrapment. In these situations, the burden
is still on the prosecution to prove each essential element of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. The only burden that possibly can be placed
on a defendant is that of making sure that there is something in evidence
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to enable a jury to consider the particular defense interposed. This, really,
should not even mean that the defendant has the burden of raising the
defense, for the prosecution's own evidence may do so; if it does, the
defendant is entitled to the benefit of that evidence and to the defense it
raises.
The Georgia Court of Appeals came to gripes with the problem in Moore
v. State." The narrow question was whether a trial judge erred in instructing the jury that a defendant had the burden of proving the defense of
coercion by a preponderence of the evidence. The charge was held to be
erroroneous. Chief Judge Bell, writing for the majority, held that the affirmative defenses do not change the burden of proof. The defendant has
no burden to show the defense, nor does he have any burden of persuasion
in regard to it. The dissenting judges did not disagree with the reasoning
of the majority, but they felt that prior cases precluded the application of
the majority's reasoning to the case under consideration.
On certiorari, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed on other grounds."
The reversal was based on the fact that the defense of coercion was not
properly in the case, so any error in the charge was harmless. In earlier
times that probably would have been the total opinion, but, happily, this
was not the case this time. The justices considered the charge as given and
laid down rules for prospective application by the trial courts. Any case
tried after June 29, 1976, will be subject to the rules. Chief Justice Nichols
said any charge that placed any burden of persuasion on a criminal defendant would be erroneous and would violate the Due Process Clause,
unless there were invited or harmless error.
The rule appears to be straightforward and to the point and, hopefully,
will be easy in application. The next few years will probably tell. To reinforce the prospective application of the rule, the Supreme Court considered
a trial judge's charge putting a preponderance-of-evidence burden on a
defendant who raised the affirmative defense of abandonment of criminal
purpose.' The court held that the charge, although burden-shifting, would
not be cause for reversal.92

XIII.

DEATH PENALTY

The Georgia Supreme Court was called upon to decide many deathpenalty cases, surely one of the most humbling experiences any judge can
undertake.
In deciding these cases, the court struck down a portion of the deathpenalty statute,93 which allowed the penalty to be imposed when the de89.
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fendant had a serious record of assaultive behavior. Arnold v. State', held
that this portion of the statute was impermissibly vague because it did not
provide the jury sufficiently clear, objective standards about what was to
be considered.
Each case raised anew the constitutionality of the death penalty, but the
court held steadfast to its position that the statute was constitutional. In
the final analysis, the court was proved correct by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Gregg v. Georgia,9" which approved the death penalty in Georgia, at
least for the crime of murder. This decision surely will cause prosecutors,
defense attorneys and judges to realize again what a serious business we
are engaged in and to reaffirm our desire to see that justice is done.
The U.S. Supreme Court complimented the Georgia Supreme Court on
its careful, case-by-case review of the aggravating circumstances. The case
in point was Jarrell v. State, 7 in which, the court reversed the death penalty after the jury found the defendant had created a great risk of bodily
harm to others. The court found that the facts did not support the finding.
XIV.

MISCELLANEOUS

In this last portion of the article are included several cases whose position at the end should not lead to the conclusion that they are unimportant.
Burke v. State,9 8 Dobbs v. State" and Fleming v. State'" relate to the
merger of armed robbery with murder. Burke held that armed robbery
merged with felony-murder when the felony was the armed robbery. It
should also be noted that in Burke the actual killing was done by another.
Immediately after this decision, appeals began to try to take advantage of
this decision. However, the court in Dobbs and Fleming explained Burke
and held that when one is indicted for malice-murder and robbery, there
is no merger, especially when the appellant himself pulls the trigger.
Wilson v. State'9 ' and Aldridge v. State °2 discuss impeachment of one's
own witness. The Aldridge case, perhaps, relates more to rehabilitation.
The court now allows an attorney to cross-examine a witness called by him
and bring out prior out-of-court statements when the witness has either
testified contrary to his prior statement or has been impeached on crossexamination by a prior inconsistent statement.
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Rape victims finally got some relief from the Georgia Supreme Court in
Curtis v. State. 0' The court took issue with the time-honored charge that
the victim must be unceasing in her resistance and disapproves such an
instruction. Since rape is completed when penetration occurs, the court
said, the real issue is whether consent was freely given or whether any lack
of resistance was the result of fear.
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